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Abstract
We extend and apply computable general equilibrium methods to the study of economies
with both aggregate uncertainty and uninsured household-specific uncertainty. In our
economies the government issues two types of assets: a small denomination, non-interest
bearing asset, which we call currency, and a large denomination, interest bearing asset,
which we call T-bills. We find that a real interest rate behavior similar to that observed in
the U.S. can be sustained as equilibrium behavior in our class of economies. We also find
that policy induced real interest rate changes that are perceived as being permanent have
significant real effects and that these effects take a few years to be fully realized.
JEL classification: E32; E42; E52; C63
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1. Introduction
Recently economists have been exploring ways to introduce money into applied
general equilibrium analyses. Virtually all these efforts have followed the quantity
theory tradition of Irving Fisher and Alfred Marshall. This tradition focuses on the
) Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Corresponding author. Tel.: 34 1 624.9584; Fax: 34 1 624.9875.
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transactions role of money. To model this role of money, most of these studies
1 Ž .have used the cash-credit good extension of the Lucas 1982 and Svensson
Ž .1985 cash-in-advance model. Examples of such studies are Cooley and Hansen
Ž . Ž . Ž .1989 , Altig and Carlstrom 1991 and Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992 ,
amongst others.
The behavior of real returns on government debt in these representative
household economies is grossly at variance with the data. In these model
economies, the average real return on government debt is close to five percent
while in the U.S, the average rate of return on three-month T-bills was only 0.6
percent during the 1950–1986 period. Further, in these model economies the
expected real interest rate varies little, and this result is essentially independent of
the monetary policy rule followed. However, in the U.S. the average real interest
rate on government debt over periods as long as five years has varied significantly:
In the 1974–78 period it averaged y1.6 percent, while in 1981–85 it averaged
4.7. These disparities present a very serious problem for the representative
household approach, if it is to be used in evaluating the implications of short-term
monetary policy.
These large disparities between the model predictions for real interest rate
behavior and U.S. data have lead us to abandon the representative household
abstraction for monetary policy analysis and to introduce household heterogeneity.
In this exploratory study households are heterogeneous with respect to their
nominal asset holdings and their production opportunities. In the permanent
Ž .income tradition of Bewley 1980 , these households vary their holdings of
nominal assets in order to buffer their flows of consumption against uninsured
idiosyncratic variations in the market value of their time endowment. 2
Any model economy that explores the behavior of real returns on interest
bearing government debt must include at least two government issued assets: one
that bears interest and another one that does not. If both of these assets are to be
held in equilibrium the non-interest bearing asset must play some role which the
interest bearing asset cannot play. The exact nature of this role does not seem to be
all that important for the issues that we are addressing here. In this study we
Ž .follow Bryant and Wallace 1979 and we assume that interest bearing government
debt, which we call T-Bills, is issued only in large denominations. 3 On the other
hand, the denomination of the non-interest bearing asset, which we call currency,
is small.
1 See Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1987.
2 Ž .Other analyses of economies with uninsured idiosyncratic uncertainty are Lucas 1980 ,
˙ ˙Ž . Ž .Imrohoroglu 1989 and Imrohoroglu 1991 .ˇ ˇ
3 Ž .Marimon and Wallace 1987 assume that breaking up the large denomination T-bills is costly.
Another way to model this additional role for the non-interest bearing asset is to introduce a banking
system and to impose a legal requirement that banks must hold non-interest bearing reserves on
Ž .deposits. Yet another way is to follow Lucas 1982 and to include a cash-in-advance constraint.
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Given that our economy has heterogeneous households, its state at each point in
time must specify the distribution of households as indexed by their asset holdings
and by their production opportunities. When there is only idiosyncratic household
uncertainty and no aggregate uncertainty, for policies that result in a constant
inflation rate and a constant nominal interest rate, the equilibrium path of this
distribution of households converges to a steady state distribution. We find that
steady state distributions exist for policies with both low –zero– and high –three
percent– real returns to T-bills. The zero percent return is significantly smaller
than the infinitely lived household’s subjective time discount rate, which together
with the average growth rate of consumption ties down the average real interest
rate in the neoclassical growth model. 4
We also compute the equilibrium process for a special class of government
policy rules that allow for random changes in both nominal and real interest rates.
We find that policy rules with persistent changes in the real interest rate have
significant effects on output and employment. Further, these effects increase over
time and they take a few years to be fully realized. On the other hand, policy rules
with transitory changes in the real interest rate have effects on output and
employment that are negligible.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formally describe
our class of monetary economies, we define the equilibrium processes, and we
discuss calibration issues. In Section 3, we describe the computational experiments
and we report our findings. Finally, in Section 4 we present our concluding
comments and we provide some suggestions for future research.
2. Description of the class of monetary economies
2.1. Information
 4There is an exogenous economy-wide stochastic process z . This process is at
Markov chain and its transition probabilities are
X < X <p z z sPr z sz z sz 1 4Ž . Ž .z tq1 t
X  4for z, z gZs 1, 2, . . . , n . We assume that the Markov chain generating z isz
such that it has a single ergodic set, no transient states and no cyclically moving
subsets.
Each household also faces an idiosyncratic random disturbance, s, that affects
its individual production possibilities. Conditional on the realization of the econ-
4 Real rates of return have to be adjusted for inflation risk, but quantitatively, these adjustments are
small.
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omy-wide shock one period ahead, these idiosyncratic disturbances are assumed to
be independent and identically distributed across households. The process for this
 4household-specific production shocks, s , is also assumed to follow a finite-statet
Markov chain with conditional transition probabilities given by
X < X X < Xp s s, z sPr s ss s ss, z sz , 2 4Ž . Ž .s tq1 t tq1
X  4 Xwhere s, s gSs 1, 2, . . . , n and z gZ.s
Ž .The joint processes on s, z are therefore Markov chains with nsn =ns z
states. Their transition probabilities are
X X X X X< < <p s , z s, z sp s s, z p z z . 3Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .s z
 4  4Households know the laws of motion of both s and z . At the beginning oft t
each period they observe the realizations of both stochastic processes. Trade
ensues.
2.2. The goÕernment sector
The government in this economy taxes labor income at a rate u . This is a
proportional tax and is restricted to being a function of the current value of the
Ž .economy-wide shock, z , only. The tax rate at date t is u z . The governmentt t
also issues two assets. The first asset determines the unit of account and bears no
interest. We denote it by M, and we call it currency. The second asset is a large
denomination risk-free promise to deliver g units of currency at the beginning of
the period immediately after its date of issue. This asset may sell at a discount. We
denote it by B, and we call it a T-bill. 5
Variable p is the price of one unit of the date t composite good. Governmentt
Ž .policy determines the pricing process on currency, e z sprp , and thet t ty1
Ž . Ž . Ž .discounted price of government debt, z z sq z , where q z denotes the pricet t t
of a sure claim to one unit of currency one period ahead. 6 To implement these
policies, the government exchanges goods and currency at a price p and sells andt
Ž .buys promises to deliver g units of nominal value next period at price g q z . Wet
only consider economies with a positive nominal interest rate policy, that is, where
Ž . Ž . Ž X.z z F1 for all zgZ. An additional restriction is that z z e z -1rb for all z
and zX. With this restriction the real rate of return on interest-bearing government
debt is always less than the households’ subjective time discount rate. Finally, we
5 Note that throughout this paper we follow the convention that capital letters denote nominal
quantities and, except where otherwise indicated, lowercase letters denote the real values of the
corresponding variables expressed in terms of current-period consumption.
6 Note that the pricing policies are also restricted to being a function of the current value of the
economy-wide shock, z , only.t
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make the additional assumption that households may not pool their savings and
share the proceeds of T-bills. 7
 Ž . Ž . Ž .4A government policy rule is, therefore, a specification of u z , e z , z z and
the associated processes on public consumption, g, on the government supply of
T-bills, B g, and on the government supply of currency, Mg. Under this specifica-
tion for the government policy, the nominal version of the government budget
constraint is the following:
p g qMgqgB gsu p y qMg qq gB g 4Ž .t t t t t t tq1 t tq1
where y denotes the aggregate output of period t.t
2.3. The household sector
2.3.1. Preferences
We assume that at each point in time the economy is inhabited by a large
number, actually a measure one continuum, of households. These households
order their random streams of consumption and leisure according to
tE b u c ,tyn 5Ž . Ž .Ý t t
ts0
where u is a continuous and strictly concave utility function, b is the time-dis-
count factor, c is the perishable household consumption good which is restrictedt
to being non-negative, t is the household endowment of productive time and n ist
time allocated to market activities. Hence, tyn is time allocated by thet
household to non-market activities which we call leisure.
2.3.2. ProductiÕe opportunities
The household’s date t production of the composite good is
w s, z n 6Ž . Ž .t
Ž .where w s, z is that household’s technology parameter. When households choose
Ž .to work, they are paid their marginal product. Therefore w s, z equals the
Ž . Ž .household’s real wage. Following Rogerson 1988 and Hansen 1985 , we assume
a labor indivisibility. Labor services, n , are constrained to belonging to the sett
 40, 1 where zero corresponds to not being employed and one corresponds to being
employed.
7 Ž .Wallace 1983 identifies this non-divisibility as a sufficient condition for the coexistence of both
Ž .interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing government debt. Marimon and Wallace 1987 assume a
costly intermediation technology. For our purposes it suffices to suppose that the intermediation
technology is such that the interest rate differentials are not large enough to cover the intermediation
costs.
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2.3.3. Monetary arrangements
Households can hold integer amounts of small denomination currency Mg
 40, 1, 2, . . . . They can also hold integer numbers of large denomination T-bills
 4Bg 0, 1, . . . , n . The denomination of T-bills in terms of currency is a largeb
integer g . Since there are no insurance technologies available, agents hold these
assets for consumption smoothing and for protection against variations in their
marginal productivities and therefore in their labor income.
2.3.4. The households’ decision problem
Let M denote the nominal end-of-period household currency holdings, B ,tq1 t
the nominal end-of-period household holdings of T-bills, and A sM qgB , thet t t
beginning-of-period nominal asset holdings. Then, the nominal version of the
household competitive decision problem is the following:
tmax E b u c , tyn , 7Ž . Ž .Ý t t
c ,n ,B ,Mt t tq1 tq1 ts0
subject to the budget constraint
p c qM qq gB FA q 1yu z p w s , z n . 8Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž .t t tq1 t tq1 t t t t t t
The maximization is also subject to M and B belonging, respectively, totq1 tq1
 4sets M and B and n belonging to 0, 1 . Finally, M and B are taken as given.t 0 0
Let msM rp denote household real holdings of currency, bsB rp ,tq1 t tq1 t
household real holdings of T-Bills, and asm qg b , household real hold-ty1 ty1
ings of beginning-of-period assets, all three valued in terms of the current period’s
consumption good. Then, the functional equation for the dynamic program solved
Ž .by an a, s -type household is the following:
X X X X < X X <Õ a, s, z s max u c, tyn qb Õ a , s , z p s s, z p z z ,Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý s z½ 5
X Xb ,c ,m ,n s , z
9Ž .
subject to the budget constraint
cqmqg q z bFare z q 1yu w s, z n 10Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .
 4  4 8and to ng 0, 1 , cG0, mg 0, r, 2r, . . . ,g where r denotes the real value of
 4 Xone unit of currency, and bg 0, 1, . . . ,n and where asg bqm. Given that theb
agent’s problem is a finite state discounted dynamic program, an optimal station-
ary Markov plan always exists. This optimal plan and the stochastic processes on
8 Note that he nominal interest rate on T-bills is always positive for the policies that we consider. As
a result, T-bills dominate currency in rate of return. Therefore, it is never optimal to hold more than g
units of m and the restriction that mFg is never binding. This constraint is imposed, none the less, so
that the problem becomes a finite dynamic program.
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Ž .s, z define an equilibrium state transition probability matrix on A=S=Z. The
ergodicity of this matrix is established in Appendix B.
2.4. Definition of equilibrium
In the goods and asset market the government is not a small agent so treating it
as just another price-taking agent is not reasonable. Instead, part of the specifica-
tion of the economy must be the policy arrangement employed and the resulting
government excess demand correspondences for the consumption good and for
both assets. Features of our explicit arrangement include the properties of the
assets issued by the government, the liquidity constraints and the legal restrictions.
Other features of our policy arrangement are that the government taxes labor
Ž .income at a rate u z ; that each date the government exchanges goods for
Ž .currency at price p ; that this price satisfies p sp e z ; that the governmentt t t t
Ž .exchanges T-bills for currency at a price of q z per unit of currency to bet
Ž . Ž .delivered the following period, and that this price satisfies q z sz z . For sucht t
an arrangement there is a well defined government excess-demand correspon-
dence. We now define a recursive equilibrium.
Ž .The state of a household is the triple a, s, z . The measure of agents of type
Ž . Ž .a, s is x a, s . We let x denote the corresponding measure. The economy-wide
Ž .state is the pair x, z .
 Ž . Ž . Ž .4An equilibrium for a policy arrangement u z , e z , z z , given x , consists0
 Ž . g Ž . g Ž .4of four basic parts: a government policy g x, z , m x, z , b x, z , a household
 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .4  Ž . Ž .4policy c a, s, z , n a, s, z , m a, s, z , b a, s, z , pricing processes e z , q z , and
X Ž X.X X X Xa law of motion for the measures of agent types, x s f x, z, z , such that:a , s a , s
( ) Ž . Ž . Ž .i Given the processes on u z , e z sprp , and q z , the householdt ty 1
Ž . Ž .policy solves the household’s optimization program described in Eqs. 9 – 10
above.
( )ii The goods market clears:
x a, s c a, s, z y 1yu w s, z n a, s, z qg x , z s0 11Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý
a, s
Ž . Ž .for all x, z in the support of the distribution of x , z for some t.t t
( )iii The currency market clears:
mg x , z s x a, s m a, s, z . 12Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý
a, s
( )iÕ The T-bills market clears:
b g x , z s x a, s b a, s, z . 13Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý
a, s
( )Õ Household and aggregate behavior are consistent:
X X X <X Xf x , z , z s x a, s p s , z s, z 14Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ýa , s
XŽ .a , sgV a , z
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Ž X X X. Ž X . Ž X . X Ž . Ž .4for all a , s , x, z, z , where V a , z s a , s : asm a, s, z qg b a, s, z .
XŽ X X . Ž X X.X XNote that f 'x a , s for all a , s gA=S.a s
Ž )Õi The behavior of the endogenous variables is consistent with the policy
Ž . Ž .arrangement. For our class of policy arrangements, this requires that e z se z ,
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .q z sz z and g y, z G0 for all x, z in the support of the distribution of
Ž . 9x , z for some t.t t
For the set of policy arrangements that we consider, there is at most one
equilibrium. The computational procedure we use to find the equilibrium is the
following: first we solve the household problem which is a finite-state discounted
dynamic program. Then we use the household optimal decision rules and the
Ž .initial distribution of households to obtain a stochastic realization of g x, z from
Ž . Ž .Eq. 11 . If g sg x , z turns out to be a positive stochastic process, we havet t t
found the unique equilibrium given the policy arrangement. Otherwise, we have
established that no equilibrium exists for that policy arrangement. A fully docu-
mented version of the FORTRAN program used to solve this economy is available
from the first author upon request. 10
2.5. Calibration
The transitions on the economy-wide process and the parameters that specify
the government policy are different for different experiments and we discuss them
in the following section. The remaining calibration choices are the following.
2.5.1. Time period
Most U.S. time series are reported quarterly. Wages, however, are paid more
frequently. Our model period, therefore, should be shorter than a quarter of a year.
We chose the model period to be an eighth of a year. This choice enables us to
have some temporal aggregation while keeping the computation costs within
reasonable bounds. 11
2.5.2. The exogenous indiÕidual-specific process
In the three model economies considered, we assume that the individual-specific
 4  4productivity process, s , can take two possible values, sgSs 1, 2 . State 1
9 Note that the households’ budget constraints and the market clearing conditions imply that the
government budget constraint is also satisfied. In real terms an expression for the government budget
g g Ž g g .constraint is the following: gsu y qm ym reqg qb yb re .t y1 y1
10 This methodology takes advantage of the fact that the public sector is large in the goods and
securities markets. Therefore, treating it as a price taking agent would not be very reasonable. Instead,
we assume that the government policy specifies the processes on prices and we compute the processes
on quantities implied by those prices. This methodology is similar in spirit to the backward solving
Ž . Ž . Ž .methods employed by Sims 1985 , Novales 1990 , Ingram 1990 and others.
11 During the calibration stage of this project we experimented with shorter model periods and we
found that they did not result in significant changes in the aggregate properties of the model.
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represents high productivity draws and state 2 represents low productivity draws,
e.g. a qualified electrician who can only find a job as a janitor.
The transition probabilities are chosen so that 92 percent of the time on
average, households experience the high productivity shock and the remaining 8
percent of the time they experience the low productivity shock. We also require
that the expected duration of the low productivity shock be of two model periods,
or a quarter of a year. These values roughly match the average U.S. employment
rate and the expected duration of unemployment in U.S. business cycles. Given
that in this paper we are not specifically concerned with shocks to the aggregate
technology, in Experiment 3 we also assume that the individual productivity
processes are independent of z. The transition probabilities on s that satisfy these
requirements are the following: 12
sXs1 sXs2
ss1 0.9565 0.0435
ss2 0.5000 0.5000
2.5.3. Preferences
Following the applied general equilibrium tradition we choose a utility function
with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and leisure.
During the last 50 years, in the U.S., per capita leisure has remained virtually
constant, per capita consumption has grown at an average rate of nearly 2 percent
and real wages have increased by a factor of two. To match these observations we
assume a unit contemporaneous elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure. The utility function for our model economies is, therefore, the following:
1ysy1 1yaaU c , tyn s 1ys c tyn 15Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .½ 5t t t t
where tyn is leisure.
We select preference parameters bs0.995 and as0.33. These parameter
values imply an annual subjective time discount rate of four percent and a share of
leisure of approximately two-thirds. These values for the time discount rate and for
the share of leisure are in line with observations from national income and product
accounts on the net real rate of return on capital and on the average fraction of
productive time that households allocate to the market. We choose ss1.5. This
value is commonly used in applied general equilibrium exercises in public finance
and business cycle theory. Our choice of t reflects the fact that the average
workweek including commuting time is roughly 45 hours or approximately 45
percent of people’s weekly endowment of productive time, given that we consider
12 These transition probabilities for the individual-specific processes are the same as those considered
˙ Ž .in Imrohoroglu 1989 .ˇ
9
.the productive part of a day to be 14 hours. Parameter t is, therefore, 1r0.45s
2.22.
2.5.4. Technology parameters
Ž .The model economy technology parameters are denoted w s, z . The values of
those parameters are normalized so that the productivity of highly productive types
is 1.0. The relative size of the marginal productivities of households in their high
and low productivity times is three. This number is chosen to roughly match the
ratio between the average hourly wage in U.S. manufacturing and the minimum
hourly wage in the U.S. With these choices we are implicitly assuming that there
are always minimum wage openings for anyone who wants them. Finally, in
Experiment 3 the technology parameters are chosen to be independent of z. This
additional restriction facilitates the comparison between Experiments 1 and 2 and
the long-run asymptotic behavior of Experiment 3 when there are no policy
switches. These parameter choices, together with the denomination of T-bills and
the transition probability parameters, result in average holdings of both assets that
are reasonably close to U.S. aggregates. 13
The resulting productivity parameters for each type of agent are the following:
ss1 ss2
Ž .w s 1.00 0.33
2.5.5. Units and bounds
In addition to the parameters already discussed, in order for the program
Ž . Ž .described in Eqs. 9 and 10 to be well defined, we must choose the real value of
one unit of currency, r, the denomination T-Bills, g , and the maximum number of
T-Bills, n .b
In every experiment we choose rs1r100 and gs300. These choices imply
that the real value of one T-bill is three, which approximately corresponds to 50
13 Note, however, that there is one dimension in which our calibrated economy fails to mimic the
data: in Experiment 3 the percentage variations in household annual incomes are nearly twice as large
as those found in panel studies of the U.S. economy. The reason for this divergence is that in the model
economies, households hold liquid assets only as a substitute for insurance against idiosyncratic income
variations. It goes without saying that people hold liquid assets for many other reasons. Liquid assets
are held, for instance, as a substitute for insurance against sickness and accidents, or to make large
payments for consumer durables, college education, and down-payments on houses. Given that our
model economies abstract from these reasons, greater income variability is needed if the average
aggregate asset holdings are to come close to those observed in the data. This property of Experiment 3
could be changed by allowing the productivity parameters to vary with z. This modification, however
would cloud the comparisons with the other two experiments.
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percent of the average yearly model economy per capita income and roughly
matches the value of the ratio of the denomination of T-bills to per capita yearly
income in the U.S. The choice for r implies that the real value of one unit of
currency corresponds to approximately 0.148 percent of the model economy
average per capita yearly income. If we take U.S. average per capita yearly
income to be $20,000, the smallest currency unit of the model economies would
be worth, approximately, $30. We find this unit to be sufficiently small for the
purposes of this paper. Making this unit smaller raises computational costs
significantly and has virtually no effect on the aggregate properties of the model.
Finally, the maximum number of T-bills that a household can hold is n s3. Web
find that this value is never binding in equilibrium.
3. The experiments
In the U.S. in the 1926–80 period real returns to short-term interest bearing
government debt averaged about zero percent. This low real interest rate regime
changed during the 80’s when interest rates increased to about 3 percent. Through-
out the 1926–90 period inflation rates averaged about 4 percent. In this paper we
explore the behavior of the model economy under real interest regimes that mimic
this behavior: a low real interest rate regime defined by a nominal interest rate of
4%, an inflation rate of 4% and, consequently, a zero real return to interest bearing
debt, and a high real interest rate regime with a nominal interest rate of 7%, an
inflation rate of 4% and, consequently, a 3% real return to interest bearing debt.
These policy choices are reported in Table 1.
In Experiments 1 and 2 described below we explore the steady state behavior of
the model economy under, respectively, the low and the high real return regimes.
Then, in Experiments 3 and 4, we allow for the possibility of switches between
both regimes. In Experiment 3 the policy regimes are permanent with an average
duration of, respectively, 50 and 10 years and in Experiment 4 the policy regimes
are transitory with an average duration of, respectively, one year and one quarter
of a year. In the subsections that follow we describe the purpose of the experi-
Table 1
The real return regimes
Policy parameters Low real returns High real returns
Nominal interest rate 7% 4%
Inflation 4% 4%
Implied real interest rate 0% 3%
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ments and the calibration choices that are specific to each experiment, and we
report the experimental findings.
3.1. The steady state experiments: Experiments 1 and 2
3.1.1. Purpose
Experiments 1 and 2 have been designed to find out whether the two policy
regimes described above can be sustained as equilibrium processes in our class of
model economies under reasonable specifications of the remaining components of
government policy. Given the role of the government in our model worlds three
outcomes are possible: first, that there exists no specification of government policy
that can sustain those interest rate regimes as part of the equilibrium. Second, that
the processes on government consumption and on the supplies of currency and
T-Bills implied by a policy that includes those interest rates as part of the
equilibrium are outrageously absurd. And, third, that the processes on government
consumption and on the supplies of currency and T-Bills implied by such a policy
are reasonable.
Once this first question is settled, the second purpose of these two experiments
is to evaluate the steady state effects of switching form the low real interest rate
regime to the high real interest rate regime.
3.1.2. Calibration choices
3.1.2.1. Transition probabilities on the exogenous economy-wide process. Given
that Experiments 1 and 2 model two steady state economies, their economy-wide
processes take only one value, zs1, with a degenerate transition probability
 X < 4matrix given by Pr z s1 zs1 s1.
3.1.2.2. GoÕernment policy. Experiment 1 explores the steady state behavior of the
model economy under the low interest rate regime. The policy parameter choices
for that regime are us0.20, es1.05 and zs0.995012. These parameter choices
imply an average tax rate of 20%, an inflation rate of 4% and a nominal interest
rate of 4%. Consequently, the real interest rate in this economy is zero.
Experiment 2 explores the steady state behavior of the model economy under
the high interest rate regime. The monetary policy parameter choices for that
regime are es1.05 and zs0.991288. These parameter choices imply an inflation
rate of 4% and a nominal interest rate of 7%. Consequently, the real interest rate in
this economy is 3%. Given those components of government policy, the labor
income tax rate is then calibrated so that the steady state value of public
consumption is approximately 0.205: the same value as the one obtained in
Experiment 1. The tax rate that renders this value is us0.21682. Therefore, the
two steady state experiments have the same inflation rates and the same levels of
12
public consumption and they differ in their nominal interest rates and labor income
tax rates, and in the steady sate government supplies of currency and T-Bills.
3.2. Findings
The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 are reported in Table 1. 14 The most
significant of those findings are the following:
( )i In Experiment 1, steady state government consumption is 20.5% of output and
T-Bills and currency holdings are, respectively, 28.8% and 12.3%. We therefore
conclude that when households are liquidity constrained and they hold nominal
assets as a substitute for insurance against income risks, low real interest rate
regimes are feasible under reasonable specifications of government policy.
( ) 15 Žii In Experiment 2, steady state government debt is also 0.205 this value now
.corresponds to, approximately, 21.1% of output and T-Bill and currency holdings
Ž . Ž .are, respectively, 0.333 34.2% of output and 0.101 10.4% . We therefore also
conclude that high real rates of return regimes are also feasible in this class of
model economies under reasonable specifications of government policy.
( )iii When households are liquidity constrained and hold nominal assets as a
substitute for insurance against income risks, government policies that imply a
lower real rate of return on those assets are expansionary. From Table 2 we see
that reducing real returns to government debt while keeping public consumption
Žconstant implies an increase in output and hours of approximately 3% 2.77 and
.2.93% to be precise , and a reduction in total asset holdings of about 5% – this
reduction in total assets is brought about by a 14% reduction in T-Bill holdings
and a 21% increase in currency holdings. Moreover, in this class of model worlds,
reducing the real return to government debt while keeping public consumption
constant increases the government deficit. This result arises from the fact that the
reduction in income tax revenues resulting from both the lower tax base and the
lower income tax rate is greater than the reduced interest payments on government
debt.
3.3. Persistent and transitory regime changes: Experiments 3 and 4
3.3.1. Purpose
Experiments 3 and 4 have been designed to explore the behavior of our model
economy when aggregate uncertainty is considered. In these two experiments
14 The results reported in Table 1 have been renormalized using Experiment 1’s output as the
normalization factor. Hence in the results reported for Experiment 1, variable levels and variable shares
of output coincide.
15 In this case by construction.
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Table 2
Steady State Model Aggregates
Exp. 1 Exp. 2
rs0 rs3
Product account
Ž .Output y 1.000 0.972
Ž .Private consumption c 0.795 0.767
Ž .Public consumption g 0.205 0.205
Labor input
Ž .Hours h 3.079 2.992
Ž .Productivity yrh 0.325 0.325
Asset holdings
Ž .Total real assets a 0.411 0.434
Ž .T-Bills b 0.288 0.333
Ž .Currency m 0.123 0.101
GoÕernment account
Tax receipts 0.200 0.211
Interest payments 0.000 0.010
aGovernment deficit 0.005 0.004
a Note that the government deficit equals seignorage revenues.
stochastic switches between the low and the high policy regimes are possible. 16 In
Experiment 3 both regimes are relatively persistent. To mimic the U.S. experience
the expected duration of the low interest rate regime is 50 years and the expected
duration of the high interest rate regime is 10 years. In Experiment 4 both policy
regimes are relatively transitory. To keep the duration ratios roughly invariant, the
expected duration of the low interest rate regime is one year and the expected
duration of the high interest rate regime is one quarter of a year. The purpose of
these two experiments is to explore the aggregate effects of permanent policy
switches that occur after long periods of policy stability. To that purpose we
simulate a 50 year realization of the low interest rate regime after which there is a
policy switch to the high interest rate regime. In Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Fig. 3 we
represent the responses of respectively aggregate output, consumption and asset
holdings after the policy switch takes place.
3.3.2. Calibration choices
3.3.2.1. Transition probabilities on the exogenous economy wide process. In
Experiments 3 and 4 we model policy switches between low and high real interest
16 Ž Ž ..In a strict sense see Cooley and LeRoy 1985 there is only one policy regime which consists of
two policy rules and a given probability of switches. We will, however, informally refer to the periods
in which the different policy rules are followed as different regimes.
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Ž .Fig. 1. Output response low to high .
regimes. Consequently, the aggregate process, z, can, therefore, take two values,
 4zg 1, 2 , where state zs1 represents the low real rate of return regime, and state
zs2 represents the high real rate of return regime. In Experiment 3 the transition
probabilities on z are chosen to imply expected durations of the high and low real
Ž .Fig. 2. Private consumption response low to high .
Note that in all cases aggregates have been normalized at period 0 to be 1.
15
Ž .Fig. 3. Asset holdings response low to high .
return regimes of, respectively, 50 and 10 years which correspond to 400 and 80
model periods. Given that the expected duration of a state in a Markov chain is the
Ž . Ž .reciprocal of 1yp z, z , where p z, z is the conditional probability of state z
occurring again the following period, the transition probability matrix for the
economy-wide process that satisfies these properties is the following:
zXs1 zXs2
zs1 0.9975 0.0025
zs2 0.0125 0.9875
In Experiment 4 the transition probabilities on z are chosen to imply expected
durations of the high and low real return regimes of, respectively, one year and
one quarter of a year, which correspond to 8 and 2 model periods. The transition
probability matrix for the economy-wide process that satisfies these properties is
the following:
zXs1 zXs2
zs1 0.875 0.125
zs2 0.5000 0.5000
3.3.2.2. GoÕernment policy. In Experiment 3 the policy parameter choices for,
respectively, the low and the high interest rate regimes are the following:
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .e 1 se 2 s1.05, z 1 s0.995012, z 2 s0.991288, u 1 s0.2 and u 2 s
0.21682. These choices imply a normalized average level of public consumption
16
Ž .Fig. 4. Public consumption response low to high .
Note that in all cases aggregates have been normalized at period 0 to be 1.
of gs0.2049. 17 Note that this value for g is close to the steady-state public
consumption of Experiments 1 and 2.
In Experiment 4 the policy parameter choices are the same as those for
Experiment 3 for every component of government policy except for the average
labor income tax rate under the high interest rate regime which is chosen to be
Ž .u 2 s0.203. This choices imply an average level of public consumption of
gs0.2028, again this value is close to the those in Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
3.4. Findings
Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, and Fig. 4 show that permanent policy regime switches
that occur after long periods of policy stability have significantly larger effects on
aggregate output, consumption and asset holdings when the regimes are perceived
as being permanent than when they are perceived as being transitory. Specifically,
when policy regimes are persistent the differences between the asymptotic steady
state 18 values of aggregate output, consumption and asset holdings under the low
and the high interest rate regimes are, respectively 2.62, 3.44 and 4.55%, and
when policy regimes are transitory these values are 0.09, 0.06 and 0.03%.
17 The averages are taken over 51 independent 40 year samples.
18 By asymptotic steady state values we mean those to which the model economy aggregates would
converge in the absence of regime changes.
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Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, and Fig. 4 also show that when the policy regimes are
perceived as being permanent, the effects of permanent policy switches take a few
years to be fully realized. As can be seen from Fig. 1, in the case of aggregate
output, it takes almost two years to close 50% of the gap between the low and the
high real interest regime asymptotic steady state values.
Finally, it is also interesting to note that in spite of the discreteness of both the
decision rules and the distribution of household-types, the responses of consump-
tion and asset holdings are relatively smooth.
4. Concluding comments
We find that in our model economies, large quantities of nominal liquid assets
are held by the households in equilibrium. The size of these holdings is approxi-
mately 40 percent of the model economy annual output. Households hold these
assets for the insurance substitution services that they provide. Another key
finding is that the average real return on these assets depends upon the monetary
policy followed. Government policies which lower the real return on these assets
drive a wedge between the intertemporal substitution rate of the households and
the gross real return on these assets. In effect, such policy changes increase the tax
rate on the insurance substitution services provided by these assets.
At the present stage of this research program we abstract from physical capital
accumulation. But, given that monetary policy determines the tax rate on the
insurance substitution services provided by nominally denoted liquid assets and
not the tax rate on the services of physical capital, we think that there is hope for
an extension of this model in which there is capital accumulation and in which the
rate of return on physical capital is significantly higher than that of liquid nominal
assets, as in fact it is.
We emphasize that at the present stage of this research program it is still
premature to use these results as a basis for policy discussions. We think,
however, that these early findings are promising enough to suggest that applied
monetary theory should not abstract from the precautionary motive for holding
liquid assets. We also think that this line of inquiry warrants further development.
One extension to this theory is to introduce banks that pool individual savings and
effectively divide up the large denomination interest bearing government debt.
Another important extension is to allow for banks to intermediate between
households, with some households borrowing to finance the purchase of houses
and to finance their small businesses. A final extension is to include capital
accumulation also in the corporate business sector.
If this research program is to be successful, the aggregate behavior of the
extended model must be consistent with the observations that lead to the neoclassi-
cal growth model, and with the data on aggregate stocks and average returns on
the important classes of nominal assets held by households. We conjecture that
18
this will probably require exploiting household heterogeneity along additional
dimensions.
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Appendix A
A.1. Definitions of the model aggregates
For each simulation of the model economies we compute the following real
aggregates:
1. Output
ys w s, z n a, s, z x a, s . A.1Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý
a, s
2. Employment 19
hs n a, s, z x a, s . A.2Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý
a, s
3. End-of-period real currency holdings
ms m a, s, z x a, s A.3Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý
a, s
4. End-of-period real T-bill holdings
bs b a, s, z x a, s . A.4Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý
a, s
5. Beginning-of-period real asset holdings
as ax a, s . A.5Ž . Ž .Ý
a, s
19 Since the measure of agents is 1, levels and rates are equal.
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6. Private consumption
a
cs qy 1yu ymyg q z b. A.6Ž . Ž . Ž .
e zŽ .
7. Interest payments
intsq z g byg b re. A.7Ž . Ž .y1
8. Seignorage revenues
sgnsmym re. A.8Ž .y1
A.2. Definitions of the quarterly time series
We then used the model aggregates to construct quarterly time series for some
of the basic macroeconomic variables. In so doing, we followed as closely as
possible the procedures actually used for U.S. data. Flows are therefore quoted
annually. Subscript i denotes the i-th subperiod of each quarter. Since the model
period was chosen to be one-eighth of a year, is1, 2. We computed the following
variables:
1. Output
ys4 y qy . A.9Ž . Ž .1 2
2. Private consumption
cs4 c qc . A.10Ž . Ž .1 2
3. Public consumption
gsyyc. A.11Ž .
4. Hours
hs4 h qh 0.45. A.12Ž . Ž .1 2
5. Average labor compensation
wsyrh. A.13Ž .
6. Real currency holdings
ms m qm r2. A.14Ž . Ž .1 2
7. Real T-bill holdings
bs b qb r2. A.15Ž . Ž .1 2
8. Real end-of-period asset holdings
aXsmqb. A.16Ž .
9. Nominal interest rate
is4 ylog q y log q . A.17Ž . Ž .1 2
20
10. Inflation rate
prps4 log p y log p . A.18Ž . Ž .˙ tq1, 1 t , 1
11. Real interest rate
rs iyprp. A.19Ž .˙
12. Tax revenues
Qsu y. A.20Ž .
13. Interest payments
ints4 int q int . A.21Ž . Ž .1 2
14. Government deficit
defsgq intyQssgn. A.22Ž .
Appendix B
X Ž .Let as f a, s be the end-of-period optimal asset holdings expressed as a
function of beginning-of-period assets, a, and of the realization of the household-
specific productivity shock, s. These functions for ss1, 2 for the economy
described in Experiment 2 are plotted in Figs. 5 and 6. The ergodicity of the
( )equilibrium Markov chain follows immediately from the following two facts: i
Ž X < . ( ) X Ž .that the transition probabilities, p s s are all positive, and ii that as f a, 2
Ž .Fig. 5. Decision rules for Experiment 2 ss1 .
21
Ž .Fig. 6. Decision rules for Experiment 2 ss2 .
lies uniformly below the 45 degree line. These two facts imply that there is a
positive probability of reaching asset holdings as0 in a finite number of periods,
Ž .and, therefore, that state as0, ss1, 2 is recurrent and that the equilibrium
Markov chain is ergodic.
Ž . 4The ergodic set for this economy is Es a, s : a-3.59 . This result can be
X Ž .seen from the following argument. The decision rule as f a, 1 is the largest of
( )the two and it crosses the 45 degree line from above at as3.59. Given fact i
there is a positive probability of reaching as3.59 from any a-3.59 in a finite
number of periods. Further, if a)3.59 then no point with a)3.59 can be
Ž . 4reached with positive probability. Hence the set Ts a, s : a)3.59 is transient
Ž . 4and the set Es a, s : a-3.59 is ergodic. This argument is very similar to the
˙ Ž .one offered in the Appendix of Imrohoroglu 1989 .ˇ
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